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Social Actors
By Peter J.Hammer

The following essay is excerpted fmm " A m ' s
Allalyris of Social Institutiom: knterkg the
Marketplace with Giving Hands?" a d uppednibitb
pennhion of the wblisker. Tke article uppears i w
the special h e of the Journal of Health Polities,
Policy and Law_(-October2001 ) that uses Kenneth].
A m ' s gm~ndbreakiAgarticle ''Uncc*~ a d the
Welfare Ecommics of Medical CareN(53 The
American Economic Review 94 1 -9 73 [December
1 9631) - published two years befme pasurge of
Medicare and Medicaid - as the springboard for
examining economic, market, institutional, a d
other changes i n U.S.healthcare over the past 40
years. Arrow's article 'tranSfonned the nascent
discipline of health economics i n k a serious and
respected field of economic inquiq " explains
~ssistan't~Pmfessor
of Law Peter]. Hammer, '89, who
co-edited the collection with Deborah Haas-Wzkon
of Smith College and William M. Sage of Columbia
University Law School as part of their research as
winners of Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Investigators Awards i n Health Policy.
~ h qexplain:
,
"For medicins, 1963 was cr time of hope snd
optimism, though most of the profesion's i
accomplishments still lay i n the fittare. Most
physkians were in solo practice, and many still d e

-?

k e cills. Medical science had made trewumdms
stridor in motiseptic sutgery, antibiotics fm the
treatment of infections, a d vnccilresfw the
pveventicm of diseases such as polio, but ftv specific
thq-ppiesfor impo-nt diseases yet existed. The
deliveery ofpmf-l
setvices was vndoukdy a
market transaction, bwt medical charity war also
ccmzrycon, by mcessity i f not by &gp. Private health
coverage was m t yet widespread, and a b h g k
national health i m r a n c e came periodical)y into
political debate, the government still played little
direct role in the putchase of medical services.
Aggregate natimal spending on healthcare
amounted to roughly S percent of the gross domestic
praluct, a s~bstantialbut M l y a daunting sum.
"Some 40 years later, healthcare occupies a fm
more cmtral role in the ~ t i o Meconowyy.
l
T i it
is common to speak of a 'waedical care industry'
comprising large physiciaa organizntions and
hospital networks and of using 'competitive firces' to
discipline healthcare spending. But evm as
economics and competition have gained ascmdcmce,
we am wrestling with many of the same q u e s t h
that A m att&tgd to address: Whpt is the proper
role of markets in delivering healthcare services!
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By Peter J. Hammer
1

Frame 10:"Entering the Marketplace wih Giyhrg Hands"
You go to the marketplace barefoot, unadorned
Smeared with mud, covered with dust, smiling.
Using no supernatural power
You bring the withered trees to bloom.
The Ox-Herding Pictures
(trans. In Levering and Stryk 2000)

T

he apparent inconsistency between "giving hands" and
behavior normally expected in the marketplace is
suggestive of the tensions underlying A ~ o w ' seffort to
establish an economic role for social institutions. At times,
Arrow's analysis appears to be equal parts economics and
mysticism:
"I propose here the view that, when the market fails to
achieve an optimum state, so@etywill, to some extent at
least, recognize the gap, and non-market social institutions
will arise attempting to bridge it."
"Iam arguing here'rhat in some circumstances other social
institutions will step into the optimality gap, and that the
medical-&industry, with its variety of special
institutions, some ancient, some modern, exemplifies this
tendency."
In The Ox-Herding Pictures, a 12th century series of 10
images and poems that illustrate the Buddhist path to
enlightenment, the seeker is able to enter the marketplace
with giving hands in the tenth and final frame of the story
only after a long and arduous journey. The seeker must first
search for, capture, tame, and train the ox, where the ox and
ox-her*
are Buddhist petaphors for gaining controll-over
one's own mind.
One should expect unvarnished social institutions to be at
least as stubborn as the untrained ox. Social institutions may
well be able to serve Arrow's ultimate economic role, but
such giving hands cannot be taken for granted. Such .an
outcome is more likely to be the result of a process of carefirl
planning and eonstant struggle. Moreover, in taming the ox,
the ox-herder is also Jlanged, raising questions about the
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effects that &owds c&rts ta ~ t i c m ahmlc for L80lal
instimti~ns
may hnve
n b g m h gd e c m a mitself.
,

1
.

If one rcknowli~dp&atp variv1;1a ways tparbts snr ahti1
social insatutionsr yet &orher level of mmplmqat br
layered onto the &-§dm. E c o n d b ,hay r a p a d that of'
comse.maikcts we imtitutitlans anti of yune
insti&are embeddtd in a deeper sodd cona*t, but that m& '
embetidechess is ~ ~ c i e n tentrenched
ly
tb treat the ex@ieud.cenac
I of ywkets and ehdr boundaries a8 exogenous for pu$~ses of.
economic analysis. In many settings, lite certain commodtiqt
markgs, this m
y be s s a c i e n t reply. In hcd&care, howeviifi"
the role and scope of markets as a means of msoyrce allocation is m testable. The role of marlie as opposed to
9
current backlash against managed & illustrates the
k
continued contestability of markets in healthcare. , \
Concedmg the social dimensions of markets doe&not ,
make all aspects of mbkets or nan,mdcet institutions
,
equally contestable. Oliver E. Williamson ("The New
Institutional Economics: Taldng Stack,Looking Ahead," 38
journal of Economic Literature 595-613 [Stpiember 20001)
presents a useM schematics u g g e s a different levels of
embeddedness of marhts and institutions. Nonns, traditions,
and informal institutions are the most embedded, proceeding
next to the formal rules governing the institutional
environment (property law, government bureaucracies), to

aich

*

governance ism- detqrmbhg thE play of the game (rules of
c a t r e and cooperation), and haally practices control&
the rpeci6c dhmaon of reswrcw. Within this kmewprk,
not all aspats of mvlqet and non-&a& institutions pass
directly through the political procea. ladeed, the poitical
process itself operates against the backdrop of informal
institutions, norms, and customs. Accordingly, @)rSis of
issues such as the rale a d h c t i o n of trust in the lphysicianpatient relatiomhip might well proceed quite ciiFfer+y fiom
'
an analysis of irsuea such as licensing laws.
Impiicationa for policy &mlYd~.
Appredatieg the fact
that w k e t r are themselves mnthqgent aocial Institutions
leads to a number of related <insights.Rather thap being &ken,
as immutable units, the mmimition of markets b subject to
negotistion and change. Moreover, the helines separating
market and a o n - m k e t insritutiong are often endogenously
determhed. ApprecWbg &is mdogewity lead to ooncernd
over pamible forms of strategic behavior. Actmr meet one

'

another both in the marketplace and in the political arena.
Consequently, sources of political power and economic power
are interrelated. This provides an alternative explanation for
the perceived rigidity of certain institutions. Rigidity may not
simply be an artifact of the transaction costs of change and
the misalignment of incentives; it may also be in the political
and economic self-interest of constituents who are benefited
by such rigidity because it forestalls developments they view
as disadvantageous.
Adding a political dimension to the economic analysis
provides interesting possibilities as well as complications.
Markets are not the only means of aggregating individual
preferences and making allocative decisions. Arrow himself
acknowledges a legitimate role for government in the face of
market failures. Some healthcare problems may be more
amenable to political rather than economic decision making.
At a minimum, the option of utilizing the political process in
lieu of markets provides an additional point of reference for
conducting comparative institutional analyses. The decisionmaking heuristics identified in the discussion of welfare
economics are largely applicable to policy-making in t h ~ s
realm as well. One should still be concerned about defining
the domain of legitimate justifications for displacing markets
with non-market institutions, constructing a functional screen
for identifying conduct that is in the public interest,
maintaining a sensitivity to notions of dynamic efficiency and
the adaptability of non-market institutions, and, finally,
hedging against the possible overbreadth of non-market
interventions. The primary differences are that in this setting
the underlying metric of welfare economics is itself
contestable and up for grabs, and an appreciation of the
endogenity of the line between markets and non-market
institutions heightens the need t o be concerned about
strategic behavior. Social institutions can be used not only as a
means of filling the optimality gap, they can also serve as
fortresses Goni which even the socially productive evolution
of markets can be forestalled, if such evolution is contrary to
the interests or those controlling prevailing institutional
structures.

Contemporary policy relevance of market and
non-market institutions
Striking the \;\irong balance bet\\leeii market and nonmarket institutions can be costly. Few people would defend
the totality of healthcare institutions that existed in 1963 as
being consistent with Arrow's optimality-gap-filling
conjecture. In antitrust parlance, even if some of the nonmarket institutions served legitimate econon~icpurposes,
many aspects of the professional domination of niedical
services were not necessary to sucli ends, nor would man:r
traditional non-market restraints constitute the least
restrictive means of pursuing such objectives. Developments

since 1963 illustrate some of the dangers of misalignments
between markets and non-market institutions interacting over
time.
Painting with admittedly broad strokes, the argument is as
follows: In the four decades since Arrow's article was
written, we have been confronted with studies documenting
widespread variations in clinical practices (substantially
unrelated t o quality of care concerns) and a surprising lack of
scientific evidence to justify many routine clinical procedures.
The rate of technological innovation, dissemination, and
obsolescence in healthcare proceeds at tremendously high
levels. Some estimates suggest that technology-driven
inflation accounts for a substantial percentage of historic
healthcare costs. Studies comparing healthcare expenditures
and healthcare outcomes among nations raise serious
questions about whether the United States is getting its
money's worth for the healthcare dollar. The United States
spends far more than most other countries on healthcare, yet

The political process itself operates against the
backdrop of informal institutions, norms, and
customs. Accordingly, analysis of issues such as
the role and function of trust in the physicianpatient relationship might well proceed quite
differently from an analysis of issues such as
licensing laws.
U.S. hezlth outcomes lag behind other countries in terms of a
numbell of important health indicators. Each of these factors
should give us reason to pause and seriously consider what
forces have brought us t o this point.
Discussion needs t o move beyond a simple market versus
non-market distinction, which is often overly simplistic and
ordinarily misleading. Comparative analysis of healthcare
systems provides concrete insight into the notion of multiple
possible equilibria and competing sets of market-non-market
institutions. Highly defensible systems can be constructed
using coiilbinations of building blocks from each domain.
What is more important (and what arguably has been missing
from U.S. health policy) is a commitment t o intra-system
rationality. A fruitful research agenda would be to exl~lorethe
ways in which a lack of policy consistency, coupled with
misalignments between market and non-market institutions
(conipounded over time), have contributed t o many of the
healthcare problems we face today. Some of the most
important challenges facing healthcare policymakers involve
the need to impose greater rationality on patterns of clinical
practice and processes of technological innovation.
-
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Within Arrow's framework, social institutions and
professional norms are instrumentally employed to serve
specific economic/polic~objectives. They are second-best
responses to identifiable market failures. A little reflection on
the part of policymakers will often reveal that there are other
conceivable market-non-market substitutes that could further
similar objectives. We are not necessarily stuck with the nonmarket institutions that we inherit, nor can we take for
qranted the fact that social institutions that once served
appropriate optimality-gap-filling roles will necessarily evolve
over time in ways that continue to serve such functions. From
the standpoint of polic!.-malung, there is a need for more
vigilance in monitoring the role of non-market institutions
and for reassessing the boundaries separating market from
non-market institutions over time. Social institutions can
provide the market giving hands, but \rrithout active oversight
there is no Lguaranteethat the efficiency-enhancing role of
such institutions will be realized. The ox must still be tamed
and trained, and the process of herding never really ends.
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